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The United Nations Conference on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (UNCCW) is the only multilateral humanitarian arms 
control forum. Yet the consensus principle by which it makes 
decisions has repeatedly thwarted progress and is endange-
ring the current process on the use of autonomy in weapons 
systems: if negotiations for a legally binding instrument are 
not launched in 2021, this goal is likely to be pursued outside 
the UNCCW. Failure to ban inhumane technology for a third 
time in a row would considerably damage the legitimacy of the 
UNCCW. To restore the UNCCW’s decision-making ability, this 
policy brief makes the following recommendation:
  The UNCCW delegates should change their voting procedure by 
replacing the current consensus principle with majority voting.
ELVIRA ROSERT | 202101|21
IFSH – Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
Humanitarian arms control (HAC) regulates the 
use, production, clearance, and trading of weapons 
deemed particularly inhumane because they inflict 
cruel injuries or do not discriminate between com-
batants and civilians. With its origins in international 
humanitarian law, HAC has traditionally been the do-
main of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). In the 1970s, however, governments partici-
pating in the Diplomatic Conferences convened by 
the ICRC could not agree on specific provisions on in-
humane weapons. In turn, the UN General Assembly 
conducted a conference 
that, in 1980, concluded 
the negotiations by adopt-
ing the framework docu-
ment of the CCW and its 
three protocols: Protocol I 
on undetectable frag-
ments, Protocol II on land-
mines, and Protocol III on 
incendiary weapons. 
While the next three mile-
stones of HAC – legally 
binding prohibitions on blending lasers, land mines 
and cluster munitions – were set with the involvement 
of the UNCCW, only Protocol IV on laser weapons 
was actually achieved there. By contrast, the bans 
on mines and cluster bombs were opposed by some 
member states and were thus impossible in the UNC-
CW, which decides by consensus. As a consequence, 
interested governments, partnering with non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), held negotiations for 
ban supporters outside the UN: the Ottawa Process 
on Anti-Personnel Landmines in 1997, and the Oslo 
Process on Cluster Munitions in 2007/2008.
Currently, leaving the UNCCW is being considered 
again – this time by the Campaign to Stop Killer Ro-
bots which demands to establish a legally binding 
instrument for regulating the use of autonomy in 
weapon systems.1 The CCW Group of Governmental 
Experts has been discussing the topic for years, with 
limited progress. Now that it seems that a non-binding 
political declaration is the maximum one can hope 
for within the UNCCW, a treaty banning autonomous 
weapons may be the next agreement pursued beyond 
the UN framework.
In the 40 years since the adoption of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the 
corresponding conference (the UNCCW) has passed only one treaty banning the use of a weapon 
category deemed inhumane, namely Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons, which was agreed upon 
in 1995. Two major successes of humanitarian arms control – the treaties banning anti-personnel 
landmines and cluster munitions – had to be adopted outside of the UNCCW after its members were 
unable to reach the required consensus. Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW), which 
the UNCCW managed to adopt in 2003, turned out to be fairly weak, placing the clearance respon-
sibilities on the countries that were contaminated by ERW and not on the users of ERW-producing 
weapons. At present, autonomy in weapons systems, on which the UNCCW has been holding expert 
talks since 2014, could become the next problem that the conference is unable to resolve if the 
delegates agree on a weak political declaration or cannot agree at all. Launching another outside 
process to negotiate a legally binding document will again undermine confidence in the UNCCW and 
further weaken its standing. Emphasizing that the UNCCW must remain the main venue not only for 
discussing but also for resolving humanitarian arms control issues, this policy brief argues for an 
alternative: a procedural reform that would replace consensus voting with two-thirds majority voting.
 
“TO RETAIN THE  
UNCCW AS FORUM  
FOR SERIOUS  
NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS 
NECESSARY TO  
RESTORE ITS  
DECISION-MAKING  
ABILITY.”
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Another failure of this sort, which would solidify the 
UNCCW’s role as a catalyst that merely initiates 
discussions without concluding them, could have 
far-reaching consequences. First, its reputation for 
ineffectiveness could become a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy since the delegates’ limited confidence in the 
prospects of successful cooperation would limit the 
chances of such cooperation in advance. Second, an-
other failure could increase the hurdles to addressing 
problematic weapons at the international level. Fur-
thermore, holding debates on inhumane weapons in 
the UNCCW is crucial because consistent exposure 
to certain arguments has an impact on norm oppo-
nents, leading them to gradually adjust their positions 
and behaviour.2 Such socialization effects would fade 
if a separate bubble of arms control supporters were 
to replace the more inclusive UNCCW.
If the UNCCW is to remain a forum for serious nego-
tiations, it is necessary to restore its decision-making 
capacity. I therefore suggest modifying its voting pro-
cedure by moving from consensus to majority voting. 
Consensus decisions undoubtedly have a special 
normative appeal. Promising to be more inclusive 
and to strike a balance between different positions, 
they make participation in decision-making attractive. 
In addition, they indicate that persuasion has taken 
place, at the end of which 
the better arguments 
have prevailed. Finally, 
the likelihood of compli-
ance is higher if everyone 
has agreed to the new 
norms. 
There are cases, howev-
er, where reality diverges 
from the ideal. Consen-
sus may be an illusion, 
only seemingly involving 
unanimous support and concealing power imbalanc-
es. Furthermore, voting by consensus grants every 
member a de-facto veto right, which can paralyze the 
forum. In the UNCCW, the opponents of arms control 
have repeatedly thwarted decisions to protect their 
military interests.
In formal terms, consensus voting is more a UNCCW 
tradition than an explicit procedural requirement. 
When the framework convention was adopted in 
1980, this indeed occurred without a vote. But what 
appears to be substantive consensus was in fact the 
result of procedural dissent: the delegates did not 
vote because they could not agree on how to vote. 
 
“CONSENSUS SHOULD 







Treaty Date of Adoption/Entry into Force
 State
Parties Negotiation Fora
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 1980/1983 125 ICRC → UN Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons (UNCCW)
Protocol I: Non-Detectable Fragments 1980/1983 118 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) → UNCCW




95 ICRC → UNCCW
Protocol III: Incendiary Weapons 1980/1983 115 ICRC → UNCCW
Protocol IV: Blinding Laser Weapons 1995/1999 109 UNCCW
Protocol V: Explosive Remnants of War 2003/2006 96 UNCCW
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 1997/1999 164 UNCCW → Ottawa Process
Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008/2010 110 UNCCW → Oslo Process
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Nevertheless, this procedure set a precedent for the 
future workings of the conference. While Article 34 of 
its rules of procedure (RoP) does not specify a voting 
mode, it demands that all decisions be made in ac-
cordance with Article 8 (2b) of the CCW – which stipu-
lates that any amendments and subsequent protocols 
must be adopted in the same manner as the conven-
tion itself. However, the UN Offi  ce of Legal Aff airs stat-
ed in 1995 that 1) a voting procedure resulting from a 
non-decision did not constitute a rule for future voting 
processes, and 2) the conference is free to choose a 
diff erent voting procedure.3 According to Article 18 of 
the RoP, a majority of state parties would constitute a 
quorum for this – procedural – decision.
As in the successful examples of the Ottawa and Oslo 
processes, consensus should be kept as a political 
objective, but it should be safety-netted through a 
majority voting rule. I suggest fi xing the quorum at 
two-thirds of the CCW members. This would not only 
signal greater agreement but would likely be a more 
feasible reform goal as it represents a less radical de-
parture from the consensus principle than a vote by 
simple majority. Exploiting its procedural room for ma-
noeuver and changing the voting mode will strength-
en the UNCCW’s ability to act, allowing it to serve as 
the decision-making body for curbing the use of inhu-
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